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Mr. President, Members of the Faculty, Ladies and
Gentlemen:
My presence in Williamsburg today is in obedience
to a command from the President and Faculty of this
venerable and venerated Institution to assemble with
them to receive a high honor. And since I can find
no words with which to adequately express to them my
gratitude for the distinction conferred on me this
morning, I can only utter, in my solemn pride, a heartfelt "thank you,"-a thanks which I beg you to believe is "deeper than the lip."
In asking me to address you this evening the
President and Faculty do me further honor, if at the
same time they lay upon me a heavy burden. For
in no place which I have ever known are the atmosphere
and surroundings heavier with the memory,-the
presence, I should say,-of great ones who have gone
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before, than here. Who those great ones are, what
names they bore, I have no need to remind you.
Therefore, in grasping this second proffered honor, I
do so, like the poet's schoolboy, with a "fearful joy,"
yet in the soothing consciousness that where true learning prevails, indulgence and charity are her handmaidens.
Rudyard Kipling reminds us somewhere that "the
sole revenge that maturity can take upon youth for
the sin of being young, is to preach at it." I hasten,
therefore, to assure my young friends here this evening
that I shall have nothing didactic or comminatory to
address to them.
I hesitated a long time in selecting a topic for
this talk. As I drew nearer to the homeland, with
each revolution of the screw of my steamer the name
"Virginia! Virginia!" sounded like a drum tap in heart
and brain, provoking memories subconscious and ancestral; and I planned an address in which the dear
syllables would be repeated with a happy iteration;
"Virginia,"-with no pedantic or geographical implications, but as a word symbolizing an attitude toward
life,-an attempt to see life clearly and see it whole.
But much in my mind also was the great nation to
the south of us in which during the past four years I
have labored as the diplomatic representative of our
government. And so, in the weeks of travel preceding
my landing, realizing that vital constitutional questions are now to the fore in our country, I nursed the
idea that a comparison of the Constitution of the
Argentine nation with that of the United States, on
which the former is based, might not be without interest to you.
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And just here, in support of my assertion that
Argentine statesmen in drafting their Constitution
chose that of the United States as a model, I quote
the following declaration of the Chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Amendments to the Buenos
Aires Convention of 1860; he said:
liThe committee has been guided in
its recommendations by the provisions
of a similar constitution, recognized as
the most perfect, viz., that of the United
States.
"The provisions of this Consti tu tion
are most readily applicable to Argentine
conditions, having served as the basis for
the formation of the Argentine Confederation . . . The democratic government of the United States represents
the last word of human logic, for the
Constitution of the United States is the
only one that has been made for and by
the people
"
Thirty-four years later we find the Argentine
Supreme Court declaring that:
liThe system of government under
which we are living was not of our
creation. We found it in operation,
tested by the experience of many years,
and adopted it for our system."
However, such a discussion as the one I had
meditated to be adequate should be at least an attempt
to show in what ways, with the passage of the years,
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the Argentine nation has worked out the problem of
the relation between constitutional form and constitutional practice,-in a word, the operation of
constitutional provisions almost identical in form with
our own under very different conditions.
And in this undertaking it would be also necessary to show that leaving aside the physical environment and economic conditions of the Argentine and
the United States, which present certain points of
similarity, the political antecedents and traditions of
the two countries are fundamentally different.
But no one better than yourselves can appreciate
why I shrank before the magnitude of such a task.
There came to mind Taine's remark about the critic
and Shakespeare. The critic, you will remember, he
tells us, is lost in Shakespeare as a traveler in the
streets of a great city; he is shown a few buildings and
told to imagine the rest!
Therefore, before this mental impasse,-this gulf
separating inclination from capacity,-I decided I
might best fulfill the flattering mandate of President
Bryan and the Faculty if I limited my remarks to
suggesting certain analogies and differences between
those clauses of the respective constitutions which relate to the powers of the executive and the powers
of the judiciary, in the hope that my words might
stimulate some of you to independent study of the
whole field. Such a study is well worth your while,
for, apart from its intrinsic value as an outstanding
work of legislation, the Argentine Constitution provides the best example to be found of the application
of English law under Hispanic administration, of the
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grafting of a shoot from Anglo-Saxon genius on a stock
whose roots grew in Latin soil.
By way of baldest background, I would recall to
you the Declaration of Independence given to the
world by the United Provinces of La Plata on July 9,
1816. But these United Provinces, despite their name,
were sadly torn asunder for many years. Various
governing juntas gave way under stress of circumstances to a triumvirate, to be displaced by a supreme
director.
Finally, in 1829, there appears on the stage of
Argentine history a sanguinary figure,-J uan Manuel
Rosas. Becoming Governor of Buenos Aires, he inaugurated a period of personal rule known in Argentine
history as "The Tyranny," which lasted until 1852,
when, following the defeat of his army, he fled the
country, never to return.
In 1853, the year succeeding the flight of Rosas,
there met in the city of Santa Fe a group of outstanding men charged with the duty of drafting a constitution for the Argentine nation. The result of
their labors, based on our great charter, remains today,
with amendments made in 1860, 1866, and 1898, the
palladium of the people's rights.
These delegates were not representatives of united
states or provinces, but of the Argentine nation.-"We,
the representatives of the people of the Argentine
nation," reads the preamble.
Let us now consider the clauses of the Argentine
Constitution referring to the executive and judicial
power-to which I have alluded as being the subject
of my remarks.
In any consideration of the position of the ex-
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ecutive under the Argentine Constitution as compared
with our own, it should be borne in mind that, as a
political philosopher once observed, the Anglo-Saxon
ind is essentially" legislative, and the Latin min
e~!ially executive. Argentina inherited from Spain
traditions of a vigorous executive, accustomed to act
without consulting any other authority, and dominating the legislative authority whenever brought into
conflict therewith. The idea of an executive subordinated to the legislature was completely foreign to
Spanish ideas of the eighteenth century, and through
the past hundred years in Argentine history the
supremacy of the executive over the legislative authority has been characteristic of the political development of the country, both in provincial and federal
governments.
The Argentine Constitution declares that "the
executive power of the nation shall be exercised by a
citizen with the title of 'President of the Argentine
Nation.''' The remaining clauses under this head in
general follow those of the United States, but go beyond them, for it was the desire and the intent of the
framers of the Argentine Constitution to grant far
greater power to the executive than is granted under
our own, to the end that he should be able to maintain
national unity. On the other hand, at the time of the
adoption of the Argentine Constitution the country
was still staggering under the shock of the Rosas
dictatorship; and since this could not be quite forgotten, the result was a grant of great power, coupled
with numerous provisions intended to prevent its
abuse.
Some of the clauses which depart from the Ameri8

can model may be appositely cited: The President
may not leave the country, or even the capital, without the consent of Congress; should he do so, the VicePresident becomes President pro-tempore. Again, an
Argentine President must be a member of the Roman
Catholic Church, with all the conservative implications of such allegiance. He must have an income of
approximately two thousand dollars. He must be a
native citizen, or, if born abroad, the son of a native
citizen. (The inclusion of sons of native Argentinians
born in foreign lands as presidentially eligible was
deemed advisable primarily because of the great number of patriots who had been driven from the country
under "The Tyranny," and whose sons, in consequence, had been born abroad.) The moderate income requirement inserted in this article serves to
illustrate the conservatism of the men of 1853 who
dominated the Santa Fe convention.
A fierce parliamentary debate was waged over
the provision that the President and Vice-President be
members of the Roman Catholic communion. Some
pointed out that it was contrary to the liberal spirit
of the day; others maintained that the proviso was
unnecessary, since the overwhelming majority of the
inhabitants of the nation were, as they are today,
Roman Catholics, and would naturally elect a member
of their own faith to the highest office of the nation.
Still others argued vehemently that the very fact of
Roman Catholic numerical superiority in Argentina
made it necessary for the welfare of the country to
guard against the possibility of any but a Roman
Catholic becoming President; and, as is seen, this
latter view ultimately prevailed.
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The period of office of the President and VicePresident of Argentina is six years, and they can not
be re-elected without the interval of one term. In
this provision we again see uneasiness over the possibility of a dictatorship. (And just here I may mention that in Argentine legal and journalistic circles the
proposition recently advanced looking to extending
the term of the President of the United States to six
years, without the right of immediate re-election, is
being followed with great interest; there seems to be
a consensus of opinion in Argentina that the six-year
term presents many advantages over quadrennial
periods).
As in our country, the President and Vice-President are elected by presidential electors from each
province chosen by direct votes of the people.
A noteworthy deviation of the Argentine Constitution from its American model is in the provision that
the President shall take part in the framing of laws, in
addition to approving and promulgating them. Hence
the President, who is, or should be, in a better position
than anyone else to know the needs of the country, is
permitted to frame and to introduce into Congress
such measures as he may deem advisable, instead of
making mere suggestions and recommendations, leaving it to friendly Congressmen to prepare measures
which may only in part meet his wishes. Since the
Argentine viewpoint is a flat recognition that good
government implies sympathy and good-will between
the executive and the legislature, it is unreasonable
from this viewpoint to expect adequate enforcement
of laws by a branch of the government which had no
hand in their making and which may be out of sym10

pathy with-them. The authority thus conferred on
the President to initiate legislation would seem to
possess certain obvious advantages over our limitation
of his powers to making and sending messages on the
state of the Union!
You will recall that the President of the United
States, with the consent of the Senate, names all
officers whose appointment is not otherwise provided
for by the Constitution. No such limitation exists in
the case -of the President of Argentina. He can thus
exercise a tremendous power, and is enabled to resist
attempts of the legislative authority to encroach upon
executive prerogative. And if critics have pointed out
that from time to time there has been abuse of this
exclusive appointing power, the question arises whether
the requirement of senatorial approval would mean
much more than that a greater number of politicians
would share in the distribution of offices among
faithful henchmen.
Again, the Argentine President has power by
himself alone to appoint as well as to remove the members of his cabinet. This seems an entirely reasonable
and logical provision, when the intimate nature of their.
official relationship to the executive is considered.
(This power of removal of members of the cabinet
was also granted to the President under the Constitution of the Confederate States.)
An essential point in the Argentine Constitution
of 1853 is found in provisions requiring that all Acts
and Orders of the President be countersigned by a
member of his cabinet. This reflects an uneasiness
on the part of Argentine political leaders, to be remarked from the earliest period, lest the executive
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escape a measure of responsibility unless responsible
ministers joined in his acts. Here we see an extraneous
inflow, for a similar safeguard appears in the French
Constitution of 1791.
It is thus to be remarked that under the Argentine
political system cabinet ministers occupy a distinct
constitutional position, whereas, as is well known, our
Constitution is silent on this point. It would seem
from this constitutional provision relating to Argentine ministers of State,-that each "is responsible
for the acts which he authorizes,"-that some attempt
would have been made to bring them under the control of the congress, in order that responsibility might
be fixed. However, Article Sixty-three of the Argentine Constitution, which authorizes each house to
require the presence of the ministers of the executive
power to receive from them "explanations and information which may be deemed necessary," can hardly
be said to achieve this purpose, since on at least one
important occasion the minister in question refused
to be interpellated, and contented himself with a
declaration of his policy! Yet this provision of the
Constitution does give the President the opportunity
to have present in the sessions of the Congress a member of the cabinet ready at any time to set forth his
position. In practice, therefore, a bill initiated by
the executive power need not be left to the hostility
or indifference of the Congress, but may be defended
on the floor of either house by a member of the cabinet.
Just here you will recall the provision in the Constitution of the Confederate States authorizing Congress by specific law to grant "To the principal officer
in each of the executive departments a seat upon the
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floor of either, with the privilege of discussing any
measures appertaining to his department."
From what has been said it is evident that the
Argentine constitutional system is essentially presidential, and this is a completely logical flowering of
national political genius, since the political ideas of
the Argentine people, inherited from Spain, led them
instinctively to support the executive as against the
legislative authority. And it is to the executive that
the people have always looked for great reforms.
This is well illustrated by the action of President
Roque Saenz Pena, who brought about the enactment
of a new election law making voting obligatory and
providing for the secrecy of the ballot. The result of
this law was to bring into Congress new and independent forces which have shown their influence, and
which have marked a new epoch in the political development of the Republic.
The Argentine people have never been afraid of
conferring great powers on their chief executives; at
the same time they have endeavored, as suggested, to
provide safeguards against an excessive and arbitrary
use of the powers thus granted. Political leaders and
others in the United States would seem to have had a
somewhat contrary view. And in this connection it
seems apposite to quote from two great political
philosophers concerning the position of the President
of the United States.
Woodrow Wilson, a number of years before becoming President, wrote:
"The President is at liberty, both
in law and conscience, to be as big a man
as he can. His capacity will set the
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limit; and if the Congress be overborne
by him it will be no fault of the makers
of the Constitution,-it will be from no
lack of constitutional powers on its part,
but only because the President has the
nation behind him, and the Congress has
not. He has no means of compelling
Congress except through public opinion."

James

Bryce, discussing the power of the executive, in his great work says:

"It used to be thought that hereditary monarchs were strong because they
reigned by a right of their own, not derived from the people. A President is
strong for the exactly opposite reason,
because his rights come straight from
the people. We shall have frequent
occasion to observe that nowhere is the
rule of public opinion so complete as in
America, or so direct; that is to say, so
independent of the ordinary machinery
of government. Now the President is
deemed to represent the people no less
than do the members of the legislature.
Public opinion governs by and through
him no less than them, and makes him
powerful even against a popularly elected
Congress. "
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Bryce continues:
"Although few Presidents have shown
any disposition to strain their authority,
it has often been the fashion in America
to be jealous of the President's action,
and to warn citizens against what is
called 'the one man power.' General
Ulysses S. Grant was hardly the man to
make himself a tyrant, yet the hostility
to a third term of office which moved
many people who had not been alienated
by the faults of his ~dministration,
rested not merely on reverence for the
example set by Washington, but also on
the fear that a President repeatedly
chosen would become dangerous to republican institutions. This particular
alarm seems to a European groundless.
I do not deny that a really great man
might exert ampler authority from the
presidential chair than most of its bccupants have done
"
Concluding, this great authority says:
"But it is hard to imagirie a President overthrowing the existing Constitution. He has no standing army,
and he cannot create one. Congress can
checkmate him by stopping supplies.
There is no aristocracy to rally round
him. Every State furnishes an independent centre of resistance. If he were
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to attempt a coup d'etat it could only be
by appealing to the people against Congress, and Congress could hardly, considering that it is re-elected every two
years, attempt to oppose the people.
One must suppose a condition bordering
on civil war, and the President putting
the resources of the executive at the
service of one of the intending belligerents, already strong and organized,
in order to conceive a case in which he
will be formidable to freedom."
Let us turn now to those clauses of the Argentine
and United States Constitutions which refer to the
judiciary:
With those of our own Constitution you are
familiar in their general lines, while recent discussions
of this subject in the press and elsewhere should have
added to,--or clouded,-your knowledge of it.
The organization, jurisdiction, and powers of the
federal judiciary of Argentina follow closely those out~
lined in the Constitution of the United States. Article
ninety-four of the Argentine Constitution is similar
to Section 1, Article 3, of our Constitution. It provides that
"The judicial power of the nation
shall be vested in a supreme court of
justice and in such other inferior courts
as Congress may establish in the national
territory. "
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As was intimated in our examination of the
executive authority,-that in earlier days the legislative power was largely subservient to it,-so, in considering the Argentine judicial system it must equally
be borne in mind that neither in the historical background of Spanish tradition nor in the early political
development of the country is there evidence of the
existence of an independent judicial authority sufficiently strong to assert itself as against the executive. In fact, as has been indicated by an outstanding modern scholar, Dr. L. S. Rowe, to whom I
am greatly indebted, the history of Spain during the
eighteenth century both at home and in the colonies
is a record of the complete subordination of the
judiciary to executive control. It flows from this.
that the problem confronting the people of Argentina
was totally different from that with which the people
of the United States had to deal. The United States
inherited a system in which the foundations for the
development of an independent judiciary had been
already laid. In Argentina, on the contrary, there
was a long struggle between the executive and the
judiciary, resulting in the ultimate freeing of the
latter from a subservient position and the attainment
of its present high independent character.
Examining now the Argentine Supreme Court, it
may be pointed out that the number of justices is
five. Retirement is voluntary. Any time between
the ages of fifty-five to sixty-nine the justices may retire, provided they have completed thirty years in the
federal service. (By this is meant any position in the
civil service of the federal government; it would not
include service in the Argentine Congress, army, or
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navy-l On reaching seventy a justice may retire,
provided he has served ten years in federal service.
On retirement a justice receives a pension equivalent
to that of his former salary. J.ustices hold office during good behavior but may be removed therefrom
under conditions precisely the same as those affecting
'justices of the United States Supreme Court. While
the Argentine Constitution of 1853 provided for nine
justices, the present court, whose creation dates from
1863, is composed of five justices whose number has
'never been changed. The present Chief Justice is
aged fifty-six; the aggregate age of the five justices
is two hundred and ninety-seven years: an average
of just over fifty-nine years.
The court chooses its own Chief Justices, and
possesses the powers equivalent to those of the United
States Supreme Court with regard to passing upon
the constitutionality of any federal, provincial, or
'municipal law. No decision of the Argentine Supreme
Court in this respect has ever been disputed. The
court may on occasion declare a portion of a law unconstitutional, whereupon the executive may submit
'to Congress for enactment that portion which received
the tacit approval of the Supreme Court.
The various influences at work in the attempt to
erect a free government upon the ruins of an absolutism,
which so long crushed the people of Spain and her subjects abroad, is plainly evident in the Argentine legal
fabric. Furthermore, let us keep in mind that in
countries accepting the Roman law the executive
branch of government was the dominating element,
while under the common law it was the legislative
power. In other words, administrative control in
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general characterized Roman law nations, while legislative control has characterized those having the common law. Centralizatio~ is therefore natural in Argentina, and its initial problem now, as formerly, is
to democratize a government with centralized tendencies; in other words, to develop democracy from
the top down, or the reverse of the process in the
United States and England. And if one may dare to
prophesy with regard to this great country, it would
be that in Argentina, where there is familiarity with
French political history and experience there will be
evolved with the passage of the years, in orderly steps,
a government of the French type,-a centralized
democracy. And here, merely as illustrative of the
influence of the Roman or French judicial concepts
on Argentine law, it may be pointed out that under
Clause 102 provision is made whereby the Congress
may designate where offenders against the law may
be tried for offences committed beyond the boundaries
of the nation. Ordinarily, however, the trial of a
criminal case is held in the province in which the act
is alleged to have been committed.
The matter of procedure under Argentine law has
been a frequent topic in my conversations with Argentine lawyers and jurists. These seem to be of one
mind in considering that Argentina is still struggling
under the burden of an unwieldy system, inherited
from Spain, and that reform is necessary. Both in
the federal and provincial courts procedure is exceedingly cumbersome compared with either American
or European countries, and the courts are behind in
their docket. One cause of this doubtless arises from
the fact that there is practically no oral procedure;
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everything must be reduced to writing, including the
testimony of witnesses.
But when the high character and capacity of the
judges of the Argentine Supreme Court and of the
Buenos Aires bar is borne in mind, it can not but be
anticipated that essential reforms will come with the
passage of time.
In closing these unpretentious observations of a
layman, there comes to mind a remark of an English
statesman to the effect that public speeches have their
use-or justification--"if they lead men to dwell on
thoughts of service to their country and of help to one
another." I confess that the motive inspiring my
words today is the desire to provoke in your minds a
"high curiosity" to know better the great country to
the south of uS,-now my temporary home. Such
study would be a form of service to both countries.
After all, Argentina and the United States are
set on the same course. Our goal is the same. Our
methods of traveling may sometimes be different, but
our paths run parallel. And the root of any differences
which may occur at any time between the two peoples
is the root of most of the trouble in the worldignorance. And because it is an essential object of
this great College to eradicate ignorance in all its
protean forms-including that which sunders peoples
- I rejoice in its existence
who should be closest friendsand its continuance (as I do, may I add, in the privilege
of being within its gates tonight).
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